Chapter One INTRODUCTION:THE CHALLENGE OF PROLIFERATING COMPETITION LAWS1
Chapter Two THE SITUATION TODAY:A BROAD LOOK AT DIFFERENCES IN CURRENT LAWS19
2.1 Statistical Data Show Wide Differences Among Nations27
2.2 The Problems are Real and Need Solutions38
2.2.1 Merger Control40
2.2.2 Coordination of Anti-Cartel Enforcement48
2.2.3 Joint Ventures and Standards-Setting53
2.2.4 Monopolization(Abuse of Dominant Position)Rules56
2.2.5 Distribution Rules60
2.2.6 Economic Sectors Immunized From Competition61
2.2.7 Capacity Building and Technical Assistance for Developing Countries61
2.3 Governments and World Organizations Continue to Encourage Proliferation of Laws.Without Taking Responsibility for Harmonization62
Chapter Three HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS TO COMBAT RESTRAINTS OF TRADE桝N ANCIENT EFFORT WITH FAMILIAR TENSIONS75
3.1 Competitive Concerns Stretch Back at Least to 3000 B.C75
3.2 Further History of the U.S..Great Britain.and Germany?Divergent Paths With Different Systems79
3.2.1 Great Britain81
3.2.2 Germany82
3.2.3 The United States84
3.3 A Special Look at the History of the Concentration Thesis in the U.S102
3.3.1 The Core Idea of More Than One Competitor and The Concentration Thesis102
3.3.2 Presumptions of Illegality Based on the Concentration Thesis102
3.3.3 Why Re-Examination Is Needed104
3.3.3.1 The New Learning104
3.3.3.2 The Admonition of the Supreme Court105
3.3.3.3 The Actual Practice of the Agencies106
3.4 The Intertwining of Economic Studies With Public Policy Determinations by Courts and Antitrust Agencies桝 Rough Chronology113
3.4.1 1890 Through the 1940's113
3.4.2 The 1950 Celler-Kefauver Amendment to the Clayton Act § 7 and Brown Shoe115
3.4.3 The 1955 Barnes/Oppenheim Committee115
3.4.4 1955 George Stigler's Article on Mergers and Preventive Antitrust115
3.4.5 1956-1962-Brown Shoe116
3.4.6 1963-U.S.v.Philadelphia National Bank118
3.4.7 1967 and 1968-The Neal Task Force and the Turner Guidelines121
3.4.8 May 30.1968-The Turner Guidelines121
3.4.9 July 5.1968 and May 21.1969-The Neal Task Force Report124
3.4.10 1970-The Stigler Task Force125
3.4.11 1972-The Hart Bill for Government to De-Concentrate Industry127
3.4.12 1972-1980-Congress and the Continuing 1968 Turner Guidelines127
3.4.13 1982-The Baxter Guidelines128
3.4.13.1 The Baxter Guidelines Accepted the Concentration Thesis130
3.4.13.2 Comparison of the Concentration Levels(and Increase Levels)in the 1968 and 1982 Guidelines132
3.4.13.3 The 1983 Scarbrough-Pfunder Comparative Study of the 1968 and 1982 Guidelines134
3.4.14 The 1984,1992 and 1997 Amendments to the Baxter Guidelines135
3.4.15 1993-2000 Daubert and Progeny-Admissibility of Expert Testimony136
3.4.16 1993-1994 Corporate and Individual Leniency Policies of the Antitrust Division136
3.4.17 1997 ICPAC Created-to Report in 2000137
3.4.18 1999 California Dental-Decrying Short-cuts and Assumptions137
3.4.19 2002 Antitrust Modernization Commission Created to Report In 2007138
3.4.20 2004 The Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004138
3.4.21 2004 Supreme Court's Decision in Trinko138
3.4.22 2001-2004 District Courts'Discounting of Customer Evidence139
3.4.23 2004-2006 Decisions On Foreign Suits in Empagran140
3.4.24 2005 Sentencing Commission Increases Penalties141
3.4.25 2006 Supreme Court's Decision on Joint Ventures-Texaco v.Dagher141
3.4.26 2006 Supreme Courts Decision on the Robinson-Patman Act in Volvo142
3.4.27 2006 Supreme Court's Decision in Illinois Tool Works v.Independent Ink142
3.4.28 2006 DoJ and FTC Publish Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines143
3.5 Economic Studies 1968-2001144
3.5.1 1968-Bork and Sherwood-Dissents to the Neal Report144
3.5.2 1970-John S.McGee145
3.5.3 1974-Industrial Concentration-The New Learning(A Discourse Among Economists and Policy Makers)147
3.5.4 1976-Lawrence White148
3.5.5 1978-John Kwoka149
3.5.6 1982-David Ravenscraft150
3.5.7 1984-Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook151
3.5.8 1989-Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig152
3.5.9 1990-F.M.Scherer and David Ross153
3.5.10 1998-Barry Harris and David Smith160
3.5.11 1999-Timothy J.Muris162
3.5.12 2003-Timothy Muris164
3.5.13 2000-2006 Various Economic Studies165
3.5.13.1 Pautler.Paul A..“Evidence on Mergers and Acquisitions,” a Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Economics Paper dated September 25.2001165
3.5.13.2 Kelly.Trish;Gosman.Martin L.,“Increased Buyer Concentration and its Effects on Profitability in the Manufacturing Sector,” 17 Review of Industrial Organization 41-59(2000):169
3.5.13.3 Frech.H.E.III;Mobley.Lee Rivers,“Efficiency.Growth.and Concentration:An Empirical Analysis of Hospital Mergers,” 38 Economic Inquiry 369-84(2000):169
3.5.13.4 Ekelund.Robert B..Jr.;Ford.George S.;Koutsky.Thomas.“Market Power in Radio Markets:An Empirical Analysis of Local and National Concentration,” 43 Journal of Law and Economics 157-84(2000):169
3.5.13.5 Baker.Jonathan B..“Horizontal Merger Analysis Grows Up:A Review of Chapter 5 of Richard Posner's Antitrust Law(2d.ed.2001).The Antitrust Source.www.antitrustsource.com(January,2002)170
3.5.13.6 Boetal.Brenda Lynn.“An Economic Analysis of the U.S.Swine Industry:Capital Investment Rigidity.Food Health Concerns.Generic Advertising and Processor Concentration,” PhD.Dissertation.University of Minnesota,2003:170
3.5.13.7 Dickson.Vaughan A.;Sun.Yingfeng,“Revisiting the Price Effects of Rising Concentration in U.S.Food Manufacturing,” 2 Journal of Agricultural and Food Industrial Organization 1-15(2004):170
3.5.13.8 Newmark.Craig M.“Price-Concentration Studies:There You Go Again,” paper prepared for the DOJ/FTC Merger Workshop.revised February 14.2004:171
3.5.13.9 Dumont.Beatrice.“L'efficacite du Controle Communautaire des Concentrations:Une approche par la methode evenementielle”(The Effectiveness of European Merger Control:An Event Study Approach.With English Summary).70 Recherches Economiques de Louvain(Louvain Economic Review)317-40(2004):171
3.5.13.10 2006 Lawrence J.White172
3.5.14 Further Re-Examination of the Concentration Thesis by Government Enforcers is Overdue172
Chapter Four WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM HISTORY193
4.1 Broad Historical Lessons193
4.2 Specific Lessons on Difficult Subjects196
4.2.1 Believe in the“Free Market” and Avoid the“Interventionist” Approach196
4.2.2 Get the Purpose of Competition-Policy Right198
4.2.3 Illustrations of Improper Purposes201
4.2.3.1 Keeping Prices“Fair”201
4.2.3.2 Keeping Prices“Low”201
4.2.3.2 The Moralist Rationale:Protecting Small.Yeoman Enterprises202
4.2.3.3 Regulation of the Largest Firms:“Big Is Bad” or“Big Business Must Be Controlled”202
4.2.3.4 Redistribution of Wealth204
4.2.4 Promotion of“Competition as the Economist Understands the Term”205
4.2.4.1 The“Consumer Welfare” Standard206
4.2.4.2 An Illustration of the Economic Model207
4.2.4.3 Efficiency.Not Competition Per Se.Is the Goal We Seek210
4.2.5 Define the“Relevant Market” Correctly213
4.2.5.1 Ambiguity In the Word“Market”213
4.2.5.2 Thinking About Relevant Antitrust“Markets214
4.2.5.3 The Court's Failures and the Emergence of the SSNIP Test216
4.2.5.4 Challenges to the Improper Use of the“Small But Significant and Non-Transitory Increase in Price” Test218
4.2.5.5 Michael Porter's“Five Forces/Diamond” Approach桝 Business School Alternative to Examining Markets221
4.2.6 Get the Priorities Straight222
4.2.6.1 Cartel Behavior223
4.2.6.2 Joint Ventures225
4.2.6.3 Mergers and Notification Regimes226
4.2.6.4 Monopolization(Abuse of Dominance)Rules227
4.2.6.5 Distribution Rules233
4.2.7 Get the Enforcement Mechanisms Right234
4.2.8 Avoid Enforcement Conflicts(Nexus.Comity.and Abstention)238
Chapter Five LOOKING FORWARD FROM ANTITRUST HISTORY257
5.1 The Broadest Look At Where We Are Now257
5.1.1 Where the U.S.Is Now257
5.1.2 Looking Forward To Broad Reforms In U.S.Competition Policy258
5.1.3 The Challenge of the U.S.Antitrust Modernization Commission261
5.1.3.1 The Set-Up and Personnel of the Commission261
5.1.3.2 The Real Challenge:Avoiding the Easy Road264
5.1.3.3 The Modernization Commission's Requests for Public Comment265
5.1.3.4 The Real Challenge:Taking the Long Look and Hard Road266
5.1.3.5 Thirteen Major Tasks for the Modernization Commission-A Challenge to Its Agenda and Its Report270
5.1.3.6 Clarify The Purpose And Underlying Premises Of A National Competition Law272
5.1.3.7 Create a New National Competition Statute.Pre-empting State Laws273
5.1.3.8 Create A Coherent National Policy,Repealing Conflicting Laws Such As The Export Cartel Acts and The Robinson-Patman Act273
5.1.3.9 Simplify the Statutory Language By Creating a New Substantive Law in Plain English274
5.1.3.10 Reconsider Whether We Need A Separate Merger Control Regime277
5.1.3.11 If Merger Control Is To Be Continued,Reconsider the Elaborate Hart-Scott-Rodino Requirements and Adopt Simplified New Rules279
5.1.3.12 Revisit and Rationalize Enforcement Entities284
5.1.3.13 Investigate and Rationalize Remedies for Violations of the National Competition Act290
5.1.3.14 Eliminate or Narrow The Exemptions and Immunities From The Competition Law291
5.1.3.15 Suggest Clearer Rules For The Antitrust-Intellectual Property Interface292
5.1.3.16 Selectively Repeal Various Statutory Provisions(If Less Than Full Overhaul Is Recommended)293
5.1.3.17 Set Out Enforcement Priorities And Transparency Requirements293
5.1.3.18 Recognize The Need For Interaction Between The U.S.And Other Competition Agencies In The World294
5.2 The Way Forward Internationally-The International Competition Network(ICN)296
5.2.1 The Origins and Purposes of the ICN297
5.2.2 The Extraordinary Successes of the ICN So Far300
5.2.3 Moving the ICN Forward to More Successes303
5.2.4 Five Major Concerns Need to be Tackled by the ICN303
5.2.4.1 Unilateral Conduct303
5.2.4.2 Coordination Of Anti-Cartel Enforcement And Leniency Programs307
5.2.4.3 The Interface Of Competition Policy With Intellectual Property Protections308
5.2.4.4 Bringing The Competition Rules Of China And India Into Harmony With Those Of The Rest Of The World309
5.2.4.5 Helping New Regimes Avoid Adopting a“Mixing-Bowl” Approach312
5.3 The Way Forward-Continuous Re-evaluation Is Needed:Research Utilizing the Amazing Electronic Databases Available Globally On Competition Issues313
Chapter Six PRINCIPLES FOR CRAFTING COMPETITION POLICY ENFORCEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY329
6.1 The Principle of Focused Purpose331
6.2 The Principle of Rigorous Factual Examination332
6.3 The Principle of Rigorous Evaluation of the Competitive Process333
6.3.1 The Dimensions(Nature)of the Competitive Process Involved334
6.3.2 The Innovation Potential in the Particular Process of Competition338
6.3.3 The Materiality of Bad and Good Effects of the Act or Transaction Being Examined339
6.3.4 The Time Periods Involved in the Effects340
6.4 The Principle of Balancing Good and Bad Effects.and Long- and Short-Term Interests.With the Costs of Government Intervention342
6.5 The Principle of Avoiding Presumptions to Justify Government Intervention343
6.6 The Principle of Non-Discrimination344
6.7 The Principle of Transparency345
6.8 The Principle of Accountability346
6.9 The Principle of Minimalist Intervention346
6.10 The Principle of Humility347
6.11 The Eleventh commandment:Regularly Re-Evaluate Policies349
CONCLUSION361
APPENDIX Ⅰ -Global Agency Survey Results363
APPENDIX Ⅱ -Charts from Survey Results403
APPENDIX Ⅲ -Survey of Economic Studies435
APPENDIX Ⅳ -U.S.Statistics:1968-2000481
APPENDIX Ⅴ -U.S.Merger Challenges 2000-20001487
APPENDIX Ⅵ -U.S.Merger Challenges Data 1999-2003497
APPENDIX Ⅶ -U.S.Merger Investigations Data 1996-2003511
APPENDIX Ⅷ -U.S.Merger Transactions Data 1995-2004519
APPENDIX Ⅸ -Cartel Prosecutions525
APPENDIX Ⅹ -Update on Cartel Prosecutions543
APPENDIX Ⅺ -International Cooperation Against Cartels561
APPENDIX Ⅻ -Cartels:565
APPENDIX ⅩⅢ -ICN Mission Statement-May,2006653
APPENDIX ⅩⅣ -Implementation of ICN Recommendations669
REFERENCES675
INDEX699
